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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of risk-taking incentives on acquisition investments. We find that CEOs 
with risk-taking incentives are more likely to invest in acquisitions. Economically, an inter-quartile range 
increase in vega translates into an approximately 4.22% enhancement in acquisition investments, 
consistent with the theory that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake investments. Importantly, 
the positive relation between vega and acquisitions is confined only to non-overconfident CEOs 
subgroup. Further, corporate governance does not generally affect the association between vega and 
acquisition investments. Finally, vega is positively related to bidder announcement returns.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent theoretical framework of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) predicts that risk-averse 
CEOs are offered compensation contracts with greater risk-taking incentives which induce them 
to take on risky projects. However, the empirical evidence is rather contradictory. While Coles et 
al. (2006) and Gormley et al. (2013) find a positive relation between option-based incentive 
contracts and risk-taking, Hayes et al. (2012) show mixed results. Motivated by the conflicting 
empirical evidence on the subject, this study re-examines whether risk-taking incentives induce 
CEOs to conduct risky investments in the takeover setting. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
represent major corporate investments with CEOs receiving, very often, lucrative compensation 
packages (Grinstein and Hribar (2004)). As Harford and Li (2007) argue, acquisition decisions 
may be the most important corporate resource allocation decisions that CEOs take. Yet, 
acquisition projects are also investments with uncertain net present value (NPV), which may 
alter firm’s status quo and increase risk (Datta et al. (2001)). More precisely, regardless of 
whether all acquisitions increase firm risk per se, acquisitions constitute risky investments as 
they also expose CEOs to a certain degree of risk. In particular, CEOs might get fired (Lehn and 
Zhao (2006)) or their firm can become a potential takeover target if the acquisition is bad 
(Mitchell and Lehn (1990)).
1
  
Using M&As to investigate the relation between incentive contracts and investment policy 
is of paramount interest for two main reasons: First, given the well-documented presence of 
substantial agency conflicts in M&As (Jensen (1986), Lewellen et al. (1985) and Morck et al. 
(1990)), corporate takeovers – by far from any other corporate investment – serve as an ideal 
testing platform to explore the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and investment 
                                                             
1
 The source of risk (i.e., whether acquisitions increase firm or CEO-specific risk) is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our premise is that all acquisitions involve some sort of risk and are therefore risky investments irrespective of 
where this risk comes from. 
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decisions. Specifically, increases in risk-linked compensation are in line with the agency theory, 
which suggests that optimal CEO compensation should align the interests of risk-averse 
managers with those of shareholders by motivating managers to commit to risk-increasing 
projects (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Stulz (1985)). Second, while many 
acquisitions enhance bidding firm shareholders’ wealth, including CEOs with equity-based 
compensation, a significant fraction destroys value.
2
 Therefore, particularly in M&As, CEOs 
should be induced with greater risk-taking incentives to make the investment.  
In fact, following the seminal work on agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
central principle of the principal-agent theory is the positive association between risk and 
incentives (Holmström and Milgrom (1987)); in particular, higher performance pay induces 
greater effort from the agents but increases the risk on their compensation.
3 
Hence, the sensitivity 
of CEO wealth to stock price, called delta in the literature, appears to align managers and 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Murphy (1990)). Nevertheless, at the same time delta 
increases managers’ exposure to risk, which might prevent CEOs from some positive NPV 
projects when they are very risky. In this respect, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that shareholders 
can reduce managers’ risk aversion to risky but valuable investment projects by increasing the 
convexity of the relation between managers' wealth and firm performance using, for instance, 
options (Guay (1999)). Therefore, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm stock return volatility, 
which we refer to hereafter as vega, should induce risky investment choices by CEOs who seek 
to benefit from an increase in share price volatility. Overall, the aforementioned discussion raises 
                                                             
2
 It is worth noting that US public acquisitions are associated, on average, with negative acquiring firm 
announcement returns (Moeller et al. (2004)); nevertheless, almost half of the deals (42%) are positive NPV 
investment projects for a sample of acquisitions over the period 1992-2006. (The Boston Consulting Group, July 
2007). 
3
 Additionally, based on Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986) theoretical model, managers are concerned about the 
impact of investment decisions on their future careers, which may, to an extent, create a potential misalignment of 
incentives. Along these lines, a recent work by Eckbo et al. (2014) shows that high personal costs of financial 
distress provide managers with incentives to hedge against default by choosing less ris ky investments. 
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a number of important yet unanswered questions: Do risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to 
carry out an acquisition deal? What drives the relation between risk-taking incentives and 
M&As? Do corporate governance mechanisms play a role in the association between risk-taking 
incentives and acquisition investments?
4
 Finally, what is the relation between CEO risk-taking 
incentives and bidder announcement returns?  
This study draws motivation from the conflicting empirical evidence regarding the relation 
between managerial incentive plans and firm investment policy and addresses these questions 
testing the role of option-based plans – particularly vega controlling also for delta 5 – in the 
context of M&As. We use a sample of US acquisitions over the period from 1997 to 2011 and 
find strong support to our conjectures. As a preliminary step, we show that, consistent to the 
prior literature,
 
acquisitions increase firm risk.
6
 Post- or around the event (excess) stock return 
volatility of firms involved in acquisitions is significantly higher than their pre-announcement 
(excess) stock return volatility. Next, and most importantly, we find that CEO vega is positively 
associated to M&A investments at the 1% significance level. To gauge the economic 
significance of these estimates, an inter-quartile range increase in vega boosts M&A investments 
by approximately 4.22%. This is consistent with Edmans and Gabaix (2011) theoretical model of 
CEOs being offered greater risk-taking incentives to conduct risky investments.  
We also perform the following empirical tests. We first explore what might drive the 
relation between risk-taking incentives and acquisition investments. Motivated by Ross (2004), 
                                                             
4
 Governance theory predicts that board monitoring and incentive compensation are likely to be substitute 
governance mechanisms. A recent study by Dicks (2012) presents a model in which governance and incentive 
compensation are substitutes in reducing agency costs. 
5
 Guay (1999) suggests that the mix of vega and delta varies to a great extent across firms and both affect risk-taking 
behavior. Therefore, in order to draw fruitful conclusions with regards to the relation between vega and acquisition 
investments, we should also control for delta. 
6
 Datta et al. (2001) provide evidence that acquirers with relatively higher equity-based compensation exhibit greater 
changes in stock return standard deviation post-acquisition; Bargeron et al. (2014) find that acquisition 
announcements are associated with an increase in bidder implied volatility; and finally, Furfine and Rosen (2011) 
and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) show that a merger increases acquirer default risk. 
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who argues that increasing the convexity of compensation through options does not necessarily 
make an agent more willing to take risks, and agents’ attitudes towards risk are also important  
elements of their behavior, we perform a test to assess whether CEO overconfidence drives the 
relation between risk-taking incentives and M&A investments. Given the theoretical model of 
Gervais et al. (2011) that overconfidence can lead to increased risk-taking, increasing the 
convexity of the compensation contract could be irrelevant. In fact, it has been established in the 
literature that overconfident CEOs are significantly more acquisitive relative to non-
overconfident CEOs (Doukas and Petmezas (2007) , Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Billett and 
Qian (2008)). Indeed, when we partition the sample by overconfident and non-overconfident 
CEOs, we do find that the positive relation between risk-taking incentives and acquisition 
investments holds for the non-overconfident CEOs subgroup only.  
In addition, we test the role of corporate governance in the relation between risk-taking 
incentives and M&A investments. We document that vega coefficient remains positive and 
significant, while its interactions with several corporate governance characteristics (such as 
entrenchment index, independent directors, dual class shares, CEO/Chairman duality and board 
size) appear generally not to capture the impact of CEO pay incentives on M&A investments.  
Moreover, we pursue three different approaches to ease concerns regarding endogeneity. 
To deal with reverse causality, we use: i) the predicted estimates of lagged vega and delta; and ii) 
we perform systems of simultaneous equations. In particular, we run three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) regressions, in which the jointly determined variables are the acquisition investments , 
vega and delta. In both approaches our main result holds as CEO vega is positively associated 
with acquisition investments. To deal with potential unobserved confounding variables, we 
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employ the impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV) approach and find that our main 
results for vega are generally robust to omitted variables bias. 
Additionally, we perform further robustness checks. First, we examine the impact of an 
increase in vega – instead of vega itself – on M&A investments. The intuition here is that CEOs 
with a significant increase in vega should be more prone to acquire other firms. This approach 
eases concerns that our results are due to firms with persistent high vega. Indeed, we find that an 
increase in vega is positively associated with acquisition investments.  
Second, we analyze specific acquisition deals with arguably high risk. In particular, we 
examine bidders with increased return volatility after acquisitions, bidders that bid for large 
target firms, for private firms, and bidders that conduct diversifying acquisitions.
7
 In all cases, 
vega is positively related to risky acquisition investments.  
Third, we perform within firm analysis using logit regressions with firm fixed effects as in 
Yim (2013) and again our results show that M&A investments increase with vega. Finally, we 
examine the relation between CEO vega and the quality of an acquisition around the 
announcement. We find that CEO vega is positively associated with bidder 5-day announcement 
returns and this relation stands irrespective of the target public status.  
This study has important contributions to the pay incentive-risk taking, M&As-executive 
compensation, as well as behavioral corporate finance, literature, respectively. First, it offers to 
the debate on the relation between vega and risk-taking providing empirical evidence of a 
positive association between risk-taking incentive compensation and M&As. Additionally, by 
incorporating both vega and delta in our empirical analysis , we are able to isolate the effect of 
each of these incentives on risk-taking. Second, this is the first study to our knowledge that 
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 As discussed in Section 7.2, there are conflicting arguments for diversifying acquisitions on whether they are 
relatively more or less risky deals. 
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attempts to shed light on what drives the association between risk-taking incentives and 
corporate investments, which has been ignored by prior literature; we show that CEO 
overconfidence lies behind the positive relation between CEO vega and acquisition investments. 
Third, it contributes to the behavioral corporate finance literature providing empirical support to 
the theoretical prediction of Gervais et al. (2011) that CEO overconfidence affects managerial 
compensation. Fourth, it provides new evidence that the association between risk-taking 
incentives and corporate investments is not affected by corporate governance mechanisms. 
Finally, it offers new insights to the existing literature on the association between CEO 
compensation and bidding firm shareholder value creation: we reveal that CEO risk-taking 
incentives increase bidder shareholders’ wealth. This result implies that risk-taking incentives 
lead CEOs to select investment opportunities of relatively better quality.  
Our study is related to the work of Tehranian et al. (1987), Datta et al. (2001), Grinstein 
and Hribar (2004), Coles et al. (2006), Harford and Li (2007), Edmans and Gabaix (2011), 
Gervais et al. (2011), Hayes et al. (2012) and Boulton et al. (2014). Whereas we examine the 
association between risk-taking incentives and M&As, considering also the effect of CEO 
overconfidence and the impact of corporate governance, Coles et al. (2006) and Hayes et al.  
(2012) explore the effect of CEO risk-taking incentives on investment in R&D, focus on a small 
number of businesses, leverage, and investment in property plant and equipment. Gervais et al.  
(2011) provide a theoretical model which shows that managerial overconfidence affects 
compensation packages. In the same spirit, we provide empirical evidence, in the M&A 
framework, that non-overconfident CEOs only are induced by risk-taking incentives to conduct 
acquisition investments. Harford and Li (2007) document compensation policy changes after 
acquisitions. They show that CEO’s pay and overall wealth become insensitive to negative stock 
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performance, but CEO’s wealth rises with positive stock performance. Our paper provides 
evidence of a relation between pre-event risk-taking incentives and acquisition investments. 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) examine the relation between CEO pay and completion of M&A 
deals measuring compensation with cash bonus at the end of the acquisition year. We measure 
CEO pay with option-based contracts (i.e., risk-taking incentives) prior to the year of the 
acquisition. Additionally, Tehranian et al. (1987) and Datta et al. (2001) investigate within a 
sample of public acquisitions the effect of managers’ long-term incentive plans and top five 
executives equity-based compensation contracts (i.e., delta), respectively, on acquiring firm 
announcement returns. We uncover the effect of CEO risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) and find 
a similar association with bidder announcement returns. Boulton et al. (2014) examine the effect 
of equity based compensation (i.e., delta) on firm acquisitiveness providing evidence of a 
positive association. We show that vega is also positively related with firm propensity to make 
acquisitions. Overall, the findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical model of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) when applied in the context of M&As.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample and the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 examines the effect of CEO risk-taking 
incentives on acquisition investments. Section 4 explores what drives the relation between risk-
taking incentives and M&A investments. Section 5 assesses the role of several corporate 
governance mechanisms on the relation between vega and acquisition investments. Section 6 
deals with endogeneity issues. Section 7 provides some further robustness checks. Section 8 
examines the association between CEO vega and bidder announcement returns. Finally, section 9 
concludes the paper.  
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2. Data  
2.1 Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
Our sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms jointly listed on the 
COMPUSTAT ExecuComp Database, the COMPUSTAT annual industrial files, and the CRSP 
files from 1996 through 2010. Our sample is composed of 3,144 firms for a total of 28,853 
firm/year observations.
8
 Acquisition data are obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database and include all acquisitions by US publicly listed bidding firms over 
the period 1997 to 2011 with a deal value above US$1 million. To be included in the acquisition 
sample, the bidder must own less than 10% of the target’s equity before the deal and must seek 
to purchase more than 90% of the target’s equity. After matching the two samples, we find that 
2,056 bidders (6,587 firm-year observations) conducted 9,789 acquisitions over the period 1997 
to 2011, out of which 9,003 are completed.
9
  
Coles et al. (2006) review prior empirical evidence on executive compensation measures 
and argue that they were, at the very best, noisy proxies for delta and vega. Hence, as the authors 
highlight, the estimation of vega and delta for the manager’s entire portfolio leads to a more 
precise CEO measure of incentives than relying on potentially noisy proxies such as the number 
or value of options or stock held or granted. Therefore, we estimate vega, which is the change in 
the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of stock 
returns, and delta, which is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock pr ice. The 
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 Excluding firms from financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) does not alter our main results. Specifically, 546 
sample firms are from financial industries (4,390 firm/year observations). These firms carried out 1,556 acquisitions 
during our sample period. 
9
 The remaining acquisitions are pending (460), intended (8), partially completed (4), and withdrawn (314). Our 
main results hold when we limit the sample to completed deals. 
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vega and delta calculations follow Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002).
10
 Guay (1999) shows 
that option vega is many times higher than stock vega. Consequently, to conform with prior 
literature (Knopf et al. (2002), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) and Coles et al. (2006), among 
others), we use the vega of the option portfolio to measure the total vega of the stock and option 
portfolios.  
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for CEO pay, breaking down total 
compensation into cash compensation (salary plus bonus) , equity compensation, CEO wealth and 
CEO incentive measures. CEO compensation figures are obtained from ExecuComp database. 
We winsorize all our non-binary variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. All dollar values are 
stated in 2005 dollars.  
Equity based compensation is on average more than 73% of the total compensation (US$ 
3.427 million/US$ 4.693 million), and option compensation represents a large fraction of equity 
based compensation (US$ 2.311 million). Delta and vega are not based merely on the annual 
compensation, but they depend on the wealth that a CEO has accumulated over time in the forms 
of stock and stock option grants. The value of the CEO wealth, given by the sum of the stock and 
option portfolios, is on average above US$ 66 million, with most of the value sourcing from the 
stock portfolio (about US$ 53 million). The mean (median) vega is US$ 130,000 (US$ 47,000), 
and the mean (median) delta is approximately US$ 842,000 (US$ 234,000). These values are 
larger than those reported by Coles et al. (2006), a finding that is plausible considering that our 
executive compensation sample period terminates in 2010 and equity compensation increased 
sharply between 2005 and 2010.  
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
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 See Edmans et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the computation of delta and vega. We assume that the 
maturity of all options is 70% of the stated maturity. Results do not change if we relax this assumption.  
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2.2 Variables and Summary Statistics 
In our empirical analysis, we control for the following variables that have been found in 
the prior literature to be correlated with the propensity of an acquisition investment. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. We use the log of sales as a proxy of size conforming to the common 
practice of the CEO literature (see, e.g., Hall and Murphy (2002), Conyon et al. (2011) and 
Fernandes et al. (2013)). Sales represent firm’s total sales in year t. Harford (1999) and Faccio 
and Masulis (2005) find that large firms carry out more acquisitions.  
Book-to-Market (b/m) is firm book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the 
end of year t from COMPUSTAT. According to the market-driven theory of acquisitions 
(Shleifer and Vishny (2003)), firms make more acquisitions when their stock is overvalued.  
Cash reserves variable is defined as firm cash and short-term investments divided by the 
book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Cash-rich firms are relatively more likely 
to engage in acquisitions (Jensen (1986)), as also empirically documented by Harford (1999) and 
Faccio and Masulis (2005).  
Leverage represents firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Leverage has competing 
effects on the propensity to acquire. On the one hand, leverage can increase the likelihood of 
becoming a bidder by inducing firms to take on risky investments; on the other hand, an 
excessive debt level may reduce the ability to acquire by exhausting new debt issuing capacity. 
While Harford (1999) finds no evidence that leverage affects the probability to buy other firms, 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) document a positive relation between leverage and the propensity of 
an acquisition. Uysal (2011) observes that overleveraged firms are less likely to carry out 
acquisitions.  
11 
 
Cash flows variable, as used in Titman et al. (2004), is defined as (operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expenses minus taxes minus preferred dividends minus common 
dividends) scaled by book value of total assets in the fiscal year, and it is our proxy for f irm’s 
internally generated funds.
11
 Firms generating high levels of internal cash-flows are less 
constrained in their investment policies, thus increasing the likelihood of an acquisition 
(Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008)).   
We also control for CEO overconfidence by constructing an overconfidence variable which 
is based on the Holder 67 measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008). In the spirit of 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012), overconfidence is a binary variable that takes the va lue of one when a 
CEO fails to exercise options with five years remaining duration despite a stock price increase of 
at least 67% since the grant date, and zero otherwise. Differently from Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2008), where once a CEO is identified as overconfident, she remains so for the rest of the 
sample period, we measure overconfidence on a yearly basis.
12
 As noted by Malmendier et al. 
(2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), ExecuComp does not provide detailed data on the CEO’s 
options holdings and exercise prices for each option grant for our entire sample period. To 
overcome this problem, we follow Campbell et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) in 
calculating an average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for each year. First, for each 
CEO-year, we divide the total realizable value of the options by the number of options held by 
the CEO to determine the average realizable value per option. The strike price is calculated as 
the fiscal year-end stock price minus the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the 
options is then calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated strike price minus one. Only 
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 Cash flows variable is highly correlated with ROA (0.85). Thus, we do not include the profitability variable, 
which is defined as firm EBITDA divided by its book value of total assets at the fiscal year-end from 
COMPUSTAT, in our regression models.  
12
 Treating overconfidence as a managerial fixed-effect following Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) does not alter 
our results. 
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the vested options held by the CEO are included in the computation. Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) argue that overconfident managers are more acquisitive.  
Further, we include in our analysis other CEO-specific variables, which are obtained from 
the ExecuComp database and proxy for managerial risk aversion and entrenchment. Specifically, 
we include cash compensation, CEO gender (female), age, and tenure (CEO tenure). Cash 
compensation, female, and age proxy for risk aversion of the manager. The direction of the effect 
of cash compensation is far from straightforward. On the one hand, Guay (1999) posits that 
CEOs with higher total cash compensation are better diversified, as they have more money to 
invest outside the firm, and, therefore, are less risk averse. On the other hand, Berger et al. 
(1997) argue that CEOs with higher cash compensation are more likely to be entrenched and will 
seek to avoid risk. With regards to the gender, Barber and Odean (2001) suggest that male 
investors are more risk-prone and overconfident than female investors. In the same spirit, Huang 
and Kisgen (2013) provide evidence that male CEOs make more acquisitions than female 
CEOs.
13
 Finally, we control for CEO age. Yim (2013) shows a negative association between 
CEO age and acquisitiveness. Additionally, CEO tenure is a proxy for managerial entrenchment. 
Longer-tenured CEOs have usually more power than newly-appointed CEOs, and they can exert 
this power embarking in acquisition programs.  
Further, we include two additional control variables which have been shown in the 
literature to affect acquisition propensity. Harford (1999) shows a positive association between 
firm prior abnormal return and probability to make an acquisition. Our variable for excess stock 
price performance is abnormal return, which is computed as the buy-and-hold excess stock 
return over the calendar year, i.e., Π(1 + Ri,m)− Π(1 + Rp,m), where Ri,m and Rp,m are the return for 
firm i and the return of the benchmark portfolio for month m, respectively (Denis and Sibilkov 
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 Levi et al. (2014) also show that firms with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions. 
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(2010)). Benchmark portfolios are the twenty-five Fama-French value-weighted portfolios based 
on size and book-to-market. We also add the M&A liquidity index as in Schlingemann et al.  
(2002) and Uysal (2011). This is defined as the sum of acquisitions value for each year and 
Fama-French 49 industry classification divided by the total assets of all COMPUSTAT firms in 
the same Fama-French 49 industry classification and year.
14
 Uysal (2011) provides evidence of a 
positive relation between the M&A liquidity index and acquisition probability. 
The final set of variables takes into account several corporate governance characteristics at 
firm level. Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) suggest that corporate governance characteristics 
affect the decision to acquire, providing evidence consistent with benefits to managerial initiative 
when managers are insulated from discipline, i.e., more value-increasing acquisitions. Data for 
the corporate governance variables are from RiskMetrics. Our set of corporate governance 
variables is composed of five variables: entrenchment index, DCS, independent directors, 
CEO/Chairman and board size. Entrenchment index is an index proposed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) and is defined as the sum of binary variables concerning the following provisions: 1) 
classified boards; 2) limitations to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws; 3) supermajority 
voting for business combinations; 4) supermajority requirements for charter amendments; 5) 
poison pills; and 6) golden parachutes. DCS is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm is a dual-class shares company, and zero otherwise. The dual class structure allows 
controlling shareholders to separate control from ownership, effectively controlling the firm with 
a lower percentage of cash flows rights. Masulis et al. (2009) find that executives related to the 
controlling shareholder in DCS firms receive higher total compensation than those in firms with 
single class shares, a result consistent with the managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried  
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 We have also used the 3-digit SIC code (instead of the Fama-French 49 industry classification) and our results are 
not altered. 
14 
 
(2003)). We measure the independence of the board of directors with independent directors, 
which is the ratio between the number of independent directors and the board size. A CEO is 
more powerful and entrenched when he/she is also Chairman of the board of directors. 
CEO/Chairman is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the roles of CEO and Chairman 
of the Board are not split, and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of directors of the board. 
Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) report that acquisitions are more likely to occur when firms 
have large boards. 
Panel B reports summary statistics on firm and CEO characteristics. Concerning CEO 
characteristics, the average tenure is more than 6.5 years, with a median of 5 years. Thus, the 
average CEO has been with the company for a relatively long time, and therefore his delta and 
vega (our executive compensation measures) are functions of the wealth accumulated over this 
long period. Very few companies are run by female CEOs (only 2%), and less than half of the 
CEOs are overconfident (47%). The mean (median) CEO age is 55 years, consistent with Yim 
(2013). The percentage of independent directors is well-above 50% (i.e., 68.7%), which is in line 
with Duchin et al. (2010). Confirming previous literature (for instance, Ferris et al. (2003) and 
Duchin et al. (2010)), the average board is composed of about 9.5 directors. The CEO retains 
also the title of Chairman of the board in 55.27% of the observations. Firms with a dual-class 
share structure are about 9%, which is higher than the 6% found by Masulis et al. (2009) for the 
entire universe of COMPUSTAT listed firms. Finally, the firm mean excess return is 4.01%.  
Panel C presents summary statistics on the acquisitions sample. The mean value of 
acquisition deals is approximately US$ 118 million, while, on average, 22% of our sample firms 
attempted an acquisition bid in a given year. Diversifying acquisitions represent the 34% of the 
sample and almost 92% of the bids are completed. Private deals account for the lion share of the 
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overall takeover activity (78.45%), with public acquisitions representing the 21.55% of the total 
deals. Finally, with regards to the method of payment, the mean proportion of cash (stock) used 
in the acquisition bids of our sample is 46% (19%).  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Acquisitions and Change in Firm Risk 
Our premise that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to conduct an M&A investment is 
based on the notion that acquisitions are risk-increasing corporate investments. Whereas prior 
studies have already provided evidence in support of firm risk increase after acquisitions, we still 
investigate the issue in our sample , before analyzing the relation between risk-taking incentives 
and acquisition investments. We therefore examine the change in bidder risk in three ways: i) we 
measure the difference between the bidder standard deviation of daily (excess) stock returns over 
the period (+60, +120) days after the acquisition announcement and the one over the period (-
120, -60) days prior to the announcement; ii) we measure the difference between the bidder 
standard deviation of daily (excess) stock returns over the event window (-30, +30) days 
surrounding the acquisition announcement and the one over the period (-120, -60) days prior to 
the event; and iii) we measure the difference between the bidder standard deviation of daily 
(excess) stock returns over the period (+1, +60) days after the acquisition effective date and the 
one over the period (-120, -60) days prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Table 2 reports the results. The difference between bidder post-announcement, post-
effective date, as well as around the acquisition announcement stock return volatility, and bidder 
pre-announcement stock return volatility is positive and strongly statistically significant in both 
mean and median terms for both stock return volatility and excess stock return volatility. Overall, 
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the results signify that acquisitions increase firm risk and are therefore, on average, risky 
investments. To make things worse, CEOs are also exposed to risk when deciding an acquisition, 
which firm return volatility does not take into account, implying that all acquisitions involve 
some sort of risk, for which CEOs should receive incentives.  
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
3.2 Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments 
After having documented that acquisitions are risky investments, we examine the relation 
between risk-taking incentives and acquisition investments by controlling for various 
characteristics, which have been found in the prior literature to affect acquisition investments.
 
Table 3 reports the results for this analysis. In specification (1) we run pooled tobit regressions 
where the dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of acquisitions made in a given year 
scaled by firms’ size in the previous year.15 To mitigate endogeneity concerns, all independent 
variables, including vega and delta, are lagged. All regressions also control for year and industry 
fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. Moreover, we use heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors adjusted also for clustering at firm level.  
Our main variable of interest is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (i.e. 
vega). Specification (1) also includes delta and several control variables, such as size, b/m, cash 
reserves, leverage, cash flows, overconfidence, cash compensation, female, CEO tenure, CEO 
age, abnormal return and M&A liquidity.
16
 We find that the coefficient on vega is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. From the control variables, delta, cash flows, 
                                                             
15
 The advantage of tobit analysis compared to probit is that it overcomes the problem of several acquisitions being 
small relative to bidder size in our sample.   
16
 The correlation matrix of the variables is presented in Appendix B. Our main variable of interest – vega – does not 
exhibit high correlation with the control variables. This should moderate econometric difficulties (such as 
multicollinearity concerns) in disentangling any effects of the compensation variable on M&A investments. 
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overconfidence, cash compensation and abnormal return exhibit a positive relation with 
acquisition investments at the 1% significance level, while b/m and CEO age have a negative 
association with acquisition investments both at the 1% significance level, in line with the 
existing M&A literature.  
In specification (2), instead of using a tobit model, we run a pooled probit regression where 
the dependent variable takes the value of one if the firm made at least one acquisition in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. Our results are robust to the methodology employed as vega carries a 
positive and significant coefficient at the 5% level. These findings imply that risk-taking 
incentives increase the probability a CEO to carry out an acquisition deal.
17
 The signs on the 
control variables exhibit, in general, the same relation as in specification (1), with size becoming 
statistically significant in specification (2) and carrying a positive sign consistent to the prior 
literature.  
In economic terms, an inter-quartile range increase in vega from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 
percentile boosts acquisition investments by approximately 4.22% in specification (1) and 3.02% 
in specification (2).
18
 Overall, our results support Edmans and Gabaix (2011) theoretical model 
which predicts higher risk-taking incentives for risky investments. 
[Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
 
                                                             
17
 We have also run tobit and probit analyses for the probability that vega leads to completed acquisition deals. We 
still find a positive relation, which is interpreted as shareholders want to incentivize executives for creating value in 
deals, which may or may not coincide with announced acquisitions. 
18
 This percentage change in acquisition investments is calculated as the difference between the fitted value of 
acquisition investments, with vega measured at its 75
th
 percentile, and the fitted value of acquisition investments 
with vega measured at its 25
th
 percentile, divided by the latter value. To compute the fitted values, all other control 
variables are fixed at their mean values.  
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4. What Drives the Relation Between Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition 
Investments? 
An interesting question that arises from the positive relation between risk-taking incentives 
and acquisition investments is whether specific CEOs attributes play a role. Ross (2004) argues 
that increasing the convexity of compensation through options – which is an incentive alignment 
mechanism based on the assumption that managers are rational and risk-averse – does not 
necessarily make agents more willing to take risks; as the author suggests, agents’ attitudes 
towards risk are also important. Along these lines, the theoretical model of Gervais et al. (2011) 
shows that overconfidence can lead to increased risk-taking, making the convexity of the 
compensation contract relatively less relevant. In particular, overconfident managers 
underestimate the residual risk of the project and are thus more likely to invest in it. In fact, CEO 
overconfidence could be an alternative solution to the traditional problem of managerial risk 
aversion. It could align managers’ decisions with the interests of shareholders  and reduce the 
need for option-based compensation while still motivating an optimal level of managerial risk 
taking (Gervais et al. (2011)). In this case, compensating overconfident CEOs with risk-taking 
incentives would be redundant and represent a cost to shareholders. Therefore, we predict that, 
on average, risk-taking incentives should increase acquisition investments but this relation 
should be driven by non-overconfident CEOs, who are the ones that are more sensitive to risk-
taking incentives. 
Table 4 presents the results. Specification (1) includes all acquisitions. We use the same set 
of control variables as in previous analysis and we also add the interaction of vega (and delta) 
with overconfidence. We find that vega carries a positive and strongly significant coefficient at 
the 1% level, whereas the interaction of vega with overconfidence is negative and statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that offering risk-taking incentives to 
overconfident CEOs does not increase acquisition investments. In other words, overconfident 
CEOs do not essentially need risk-taking incentives to conduct acquisitions. In specifications (2) 
and (3), we split the sample into overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs subgroups, 
respectively. We document that vega increases acquisition investments only in the non-
overconfident CEOs subgroup with a coefficient significant at the 1% level, which suggests that 
only non-overconfident CEOs are sensitive to risk-taking incentives. This result is in line with 
the literature, which has established that overconfident CEOs are significantly more acquisitive 
relative to non-overconfident CEOs (Doukas and Petmezas (2007), Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
and Billett and Qian (2008)). Therefore, CEO overconfidence seems to alleviate managerial risk 
aversion in conducting acquisition investments, which makes option-based contracts less useful.  
This finding further implies that increasing the convexity of the compensation contract would be 
less relevant for overconfident managers , since they do not need particular incentives to initiate 
risky investments. In contrast, this is not the case for non-overconfident CEOs, who need risk-
taking incentives to conduct investments. Therefore, the convexity of option-based contracts is 
essential in order to induce non-overconfident managers to take risk. Economically, an inter-
quartile range increase in vega from the 25
th
 to the 75
th
 percentile translates into an 
approximately 7.62% increase in acquisition investments of non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, 
these results indicate that CEO overconfidence plays a role in the relation between risk-taking 
incentives and corporate investments, in support of the theoretical model of Gervais et al. (2011).  
 [Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
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5. The Role of Corporate Governance  
Given the recent theoretical model by Dicks (2012), in which governance and incentive 
compensation are substitutes in reducing agency costs, in this section, we assess whether 
corporate governance mechanisms capture the effect of risk-taking incentives on acquisition 
investments. Table 5 presents the results for this tobit analysis. In total, we include five corporate 
governance variables in our regressions; namely entrenchment index, independent directors, 
DCS, board size and CEO/Chairman. The main variable of interest is again vega. We also 
interact vega (and delta) with all five governance variables and incorporate all other control 
variables used in Table 3.  
We find that vega coefficient is always positive and statistically significant at conventional 
levels. This indicates that risk-taking incentives motivate CEOs to carry out M&A investments. 
In contrast, the interaction variables of vega with corporate governance characteristics are never 
statistically significant at conventional levels (apart from the interaction variables of vega with 
DCS and CEO/Chairman that are both marginally significant at the 10% level and carry a 
negative sign). The signs on other explanatory variables are similar to previous analysis. In sum, 
the findings of this section reflect that corporate governance does not generally affect the relation 
between risk-taking incentives and acquisition investments. 
 [Please Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
6. Endogeneity Issues 
6.1 Predicted Values of Vega and Delta 
In this sub-section, we further examine whether vega induces managers to implement 
acquisition investments by reporting estimates from regressions of acquisition investments on 
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lagged vega, lagged delta and control variables (same as in the main analysis). In particular, we 
use either the lagged values of vega and delta or the vega and delta predicted from the 
regressions as instruments for vega and delta. We include our endogenous variable (i.e., 
acquisition investments) on the right hand side. We calculate the predicted values of lagged vega 
and lagged delta for a firm in a given year by using the estimated regression coefficients. 
Residual lagged vega (or lagged delta) is the actual minus the predicted value.  
Table 6 reports the results. In specification (1) we find that predicted vega is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. In specification (2) we use the predicted and residual incentives from 
regressions of vega and delta on endogenous and control variables. Again, the predicted vega 
carries a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level supporting our previous 
findings. Finally, we find that the predicted vega (delta) coefficient does not have the same sign 
with the residual vega (delta) coefficient, which implies that the components of vega and delta 
that are orthogonal to the other right-hand side variables do not have explanatory power. 
Additionally, given that the predicted vega is included on the right hand side, the negative 
coefficient on residual vega is a first indication that there is no causation flowing the other 
direction (Coles et al. (2006)).  
 [Please Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
6.2 Systems of Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): Acquisition Investments, Vega and Delta 
So far our analysis has been based on the notion that risk-taking incentives and acquisition 
investments are not jointly determined. To alleviate concerns that our results are driven by 
causality we apply a simultaneous equations approach as in Coles et al. (2006). 
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Table 7 shows the results for the systems of simultaneous equations analysis. More 
specifically, we run three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions, in which the jointly determined 
variables are acquisition investments, vega and delta. We have the same independent variables as 
in previous analysis for the acquisition investments model and we follow Coles et al. (2006) for 
the vega and delta models. Following the common approach in systems of simultaneous 
equations, we use contemporaneous rather than lagged values of independent variables. The 
regressors for vega are acquisition investments, delta, size, b/m, leverage, cash flows, cash 
compensation, CAPEX, annualized excess return volatility and EBITDA/interest expenses. The 
regressors for delta are acquisition investments, vega, size, b/m, leverage, CEO tenure, CAPEX 
and annualized excess return volatility.  
Importantly, vega is positive and strongly significant at the 1% significance level. This 
indicates a strong positive association between vega and acquisition investments. With regards to 
the control variables, they are generally consistent to the analysis in previous sections and with 
the prior literature. Similarly, the determinants of delta and vega are generally in line with 
previous research. In a nutshell, our results are robust controlling for potential reverse causality 
reflecting that risk-taking incentives motivate CEOs to undertake acquisition investments.  
[Please Insert Table 7 About Here] 
 
6.3 The Impact of Unobserved Confounding Variables 
In our last attempt to deal with potential endogeneity bias, we assess the impact of 
unobserved confounding variables. Given that the omitted variable bias is the product of its 
correlation with the independent variable of interest (i.e., vega) and the dependent variable (i.e., 
acquisition investments), the stronger the two correlations, the more biased the coefficient 
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estimate, where the product of the two correlations indicates the degree of the bias.  Therefore, 
we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010), Fu et al. (2012) and Karampatsas et al. (2014) and 
examine the severity of the endogeneity problem to overturn our main results by deriving the 
minimum correlations necessary to turn a statistically signif icant into an insignificant result. This  
is achieved by estimating the impact threshold for a confounding variable (ITCV) proposed by 
Frank (2000). The larger (smaller) the ITCV, the more (less) robust the main results are to 
omitted variables concerns.  
The ITCV for vega is presented in Table 8. The threshold value for vega is 0.0145 
implying that the correlations between vega and acquisition investments with the unobserved 
confounding variable each only need to be 0.120 (=       ) for the main results to be 
overturned. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether the ITCV is large enough to 
conclude about the association between vega and acquisition investments and whether our main 
results are not affected by an unobserved confounding variable. Therefore, to further assess the 
issue, it is necessary to use our control variables to compute a benchmark for the magnitude of 
possible correlations involving the unobserved confounding variable. Hence, we estimate the 
impact for each of our control variables, that is defined as the product of the partial correlation 
between the x-variable and the control variable and the correlation between the y-variable and the 
control variable (partialling out the effect of the other control variables). In column (2) we 
present the impact of the inclusion of each independent variable on the coefficient of vega. The 
ITCV is larger than all control variables but delta and size (having a value of 0.0160 and -0.0269, 
respectively) out of the thirteen control variables, which means that we would need a 
confounding variable with a stronger impact than the latter variable to overturn our results. 
Additionally, in our empirical analysis we employ a comprehensive set of control variables 
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recognized from the literature to affect the propensity of acquisition investments. Putting both 
together, these results reinforce the validity of the estimate for the effect of vega on the 
probability of acquisition investments.  
In column (3) we also calculate the Impactraw for each of the control variables, which is 
based on the raw correlations instead of the partial correlations and is a more conservative 
measure of the impact of unobserved confounding variables. In column (3) again only two 
control variables (delta and size) out of the thirteen control variables have higher impact than the 
relevant ITCV, which reinforces that under the assumption that we have a good set of control 
variables, it is unlikely that such an unobserved confounding variable exists. Overall, our 
analysis for the impact of unobserved confounding variables suggests that our main results for 
vega are generally robust to omitted variables bias.  
[Please Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
7. Further Robustness Checks 
7.1 Increase in Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments 
To further confirm that risk-taking incentives increase acquisition investments, we use the 
vega increase instead of vega itself as main variable of interest. One could argue that our results 
are due to firms with persistent high vega. This approach allows us to test whether a discrete and 
significant increase in vega induces more acquisition investments. The vega increase is a binary 
variable that takes the value of one if the difference between vega in year t and vega in year t-1, 
scaled by vega in year t-1, is larger than 10% and zero otherwise.
19
 Accordingly, we define the 
delta increase. Table 9 presents the results. We report a strong positive association at the 1% 
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 Similar results are obtained when we increase the cut-off point to 20%. 
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(10%) significance level between the vega increase (and delta increase) and acquisitions, which 
adds further evidence to our prior findings that an increase in risk-taking incentives induces 
CEOs to conduct acquisition investments. 
[Please Insert Table 9 About Here] 
 
7.2 Risk-Taking Incentives and Risky Acquisition Investments 
For robustness reasons, we further analyze the proposition that risk-taking incentives 
induce CEOs to undertake risky acquisition investments. This is particularly the case in 
acquisitions: i) in which bidders’ total risk increased after the deal relative to the risk prior to the 
acquisition (i.e., increased bidder return volatility);
20
 ii) of large target firms; iii) of private target 
firms; and iv) of targets operating in different industries relative to the ones of the bidder (i.e., 
diversifying deals). Diversification is defined at the 4-digit SIC level.
21
 Regarding target size, 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) argue that large deals are associated with potential integration 
complexity, which leads to more uncertain expected synergies from the combination. Concerning 
private target firms, Officer (2007) suggests that information asymmetry is particularly 
pronounced in private acquisitions, which make them riskier than acquisitions of public firms. 
For diversifying acquisitions the direction regarding riskiness is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
corporate diversification may reduce firm risk because assets in place could be less risky than 
growth options (Gomes et al. (2003) and Carlson et al. (2006)). Additionally, managers have an 
incentive to reduce firm risk, and corporate diversification can be a strategy to achieve this goal 
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 These are bidding firms, whose return volatility increased over the period 1 day to 60 days following the 
acquisition effective date relative to 120 days to 60 days prior to the acquisition announcement date. Our results are 
qualitatively similar when using the period 60 days to 120 days following the acquisition announcement date 
relative to 120 days to 60 days prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
21
 Our results are similar when the target firm operates in a different industry to the one of the bidder at the 3-digit 
SIC level. 
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(Amihud and Lev (1981) and Acharya et al. (2011)). On the other hand, Zhang (2005) 
demonstrates that assets in place are riskier than growth options, especially in crisis periods, 
because they are harder to reduce. Hence, by converting some of these growth options via 
corporate diversification, managers might actually increase firm risk. Further, it is plausible to 
argue that acquisitions of firms operating in different industries are riskier for managers because 
they are more likely to be outside their area of expertise, and managers may have relatively less 
knowledge and information about the target firm industry.  
Table 10 reports the results. Specification (1) deals with increased bidder return volatility 
acquisition investments, specification (2) shows the estimates for large acquisitions, specification 
(3) presents the estimates for private acquisition investments, and specification (4) shows the 
results for diversifying acquisitions. We find that in all cases vega is positively associated with 
risky acquisition investments at conventional significance levels.
22
 All other control variables 
have generally the same relation with acquisition investments as in Table 3. Overall, these 
findings imply that risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to undertake risky investments. 
[Please Insert Table 10 About Here] 
 
7.3 Within Firm Results 
As a last robustness check, we examine within firm results with firm fixed effects as in 
Yim (2013). This allows to further eliminate any concerns that there might be some unobserved 
characteristics which lead to biased estimates in our regressions. Table 11 presents the results. 
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 The finding for diversifying acquisitions is in contrast with Gormley et al. (2013), who use a natural experiment of 
an increase in liability and regulatory risk from workers’ exposure to newly identified carcinogens of 143 US firms 
over the period 1984-2008, and find that CEOs with lower risk-taking incentives conduct more diversifying 
acquisitions (and reduce firm leverage, R&D and stockpile cash). 
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Vega is again positive and statistically significant at 10% level, supporting our argument that 
risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to invest in acquisitions. 
[Please Insert Table 11 About Here] 
 
8. Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Quality 
In this section, we address the question of whether CEO risk-taking pay incentives lead to 
larger bidding firm announcement returns. Prior studies provide evidence that, in general, top 
executive incentive plans (i.e., delta) have a positive relation with acquiring firm announcement 
stock returns (see, e.g., Tehranian et al. (1987) and Datta et al. (2001)). Our main dependent 
variable is the bidder 5-day CARs surrounding the acquisition announcement. The returns are 
calculated using the market model with the market model parameters estimated over the period 
starting 240 days and ending 41 days prior to the announcement. CRSP value-weighted index 
return is the market return.
23
 Our main variable of interest is again vega controlling also for 
delta. We use the same set of explanatory variables used in previous analysis including also the 
variables ln (MV), relative size, diversifying, completed, hostile, public, annualized return 
volatility, stock , bidder CAR (-30, -3) and M&A liquidity, which have been found by prior studies 
to affect bidder announcement returns.  
Table 12 reports the results for acquisition quality. In specification (1) vega is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates that CEO risk-taking incentive pay 
plans are related with an increase in bidding firm shareholders’ wealth. The signs on the control 
variables are, generally, consistent to the prior M&A literature. For instance, size, cash reserves, 
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 We also use alternative short-run announcement period return windows such as (-1, +1) and (-5, +5); we use 
equally-weighted CRSP index (as opposed to value-weighted) as the market return; iii) we use market-adjusted 
abnormal returns (i.e., assuming α=0 and β=1 as market model parameters); iv) we winsorize the returns at the 1st 
and 99
th
, or 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles to control for outliers. None of these variations change our results. 
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public, stock  and M&A liquidity hold a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
conventional levels, whereas completed is positively associated with bidder announcement 
returns. In specification (2) we perform the same analysis using also the interaction of vega (and 
delta) with public to examine whether target status affects the relation between vega (and delta) 
and bidder announcement returns. We find that vega itself is still positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level, whereas the interaction of vega with public is 
insignificant at conventional levels. Finally, in specification (3) we interact vega with 
overconfidence (and delta with overconfidence). While vega itself remains positive and 
significant at the 5% significance level, the interaction variables are not significant at 
conventional levels, which suggests that overconfidence does not affect the association between 
vega (and delta) and bidder announcement returns. Additionally, in our tests we do not find 
evidence that deals carried out by overconfident CEOs are worse off. In sum, this positive 
relation between risk-taking incentives and bidder stock returns allows us to conclude that CEOs 
with higher risk-taking incentives select investment opportunities of relatively better quality in 
line with the theoretical predictions of Edmans and Gabaix (2011).  
[Please Insert Table 12 About Here] 
 
9. Conclusions 
Consistent with the theoretical model which predicts that risk-averse CEOs with greater 
risk-taking pay incentives are induced to undertake risky projects, we find that risk-taking 
incentives, measured with vega, are positively related with M&A investments. In economic 
terms, an inter-quartile range increase in vega translates into an approximately 4.22% 
enhancement in acquisition investments.  
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In addition, we provide evidence that the positive relation between vega and acquisitions is 
confined only to non-overconfident CEOs subgroup. Addressing the problem of causality does 
not change our main conclusion of the positive association between CEO vega and acquisition 
investments. Additionally, we provide evidence that our results are generally robust to omitted 
variables concerns. Finally, we find a positive association between CEO risk-taking incentives 
and bidder announcement returns, irrespective of the target public status.  
Our findings have also important implications. In particular, higher option-based CEO pay 
might have led to the increase in the M&A activity before the recent financial crisis that peaked 
in 2008. Additionally, our results imply that corporate boards should structure compensation 
packages based not only on the riskiness of the project but also on the behavioral characteristics 
of the CEO. After all, as Goel and Thakor (2008, page 2739) argue, “CEO overconfidence is an 
empirically detectable attribute”. In addition, the findings on confidence level pave the way for 
future research in determining potential other factors that might drive the relation between risk-
taking incentives and corporate investments. Finally, the positive relation between CEO risk-
taking incentives and bidder stock returns provides evidence in support of the view that risk-
taking incentives motivate managers to select investment opportunities of relatively better 
quality.  
Nevertheless, a question that arises from the bidder announcement return results is what 
prevents firms to always offer a high vega for acquisitions? Potential explanations for firms not 
offering high levels of risk-taking incentives to CEOs are related, for example, to the association 
between vega and systematic risk (Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012)), to misreporting (Larcker 
et al. (2013)), and to the reputational costs for the firm’s directors (Ertimur et al. (2012)). First, 
Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) show that vega is associated with an increase in systematic 
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risk because CEOs can hedge this risk by buying the market portfolio. As the authors argue  
(page 87): “this   could lead to excessive systematic risk in equity markets, which may, in 
turn, lead to reduced risk-sharing among investors and lower firm values”. Second, Larcker et al.  
(2013) document a positive association between vega and misreporting, which might reduce the 
benefits from a high vega for some firms. Finally, Ertimur et al. (2012) posit that outside 
directors, especially those who are compensation committee members, may not be inclined to 
increase executives’ risk-taking incentives because there could be reputational penalties if they 
later fail to monitor effectively. Despite these explanations, we hope future research will shed 
light on why high vega levels are not optimal for all firms even if they lead to better acquisitions.  
In response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this paper indicate 
that CEO pay incentives-risk taking mechanism does function in firm investment decisions 
inducing CEOs to undertake acquisitions, in return for higher compensation. Additionally, non-
overconfident CEOs drive the positive relation between risk-taking incentives and corporate 
acquisitions. Further, corporate governance mechanisms do not generally seem to affect the 
relation between risk-taking incentives and acquisition investments. Finally, the link of 
managerial wealth with firm performance improves CEOs risk-taking investment choices at the 
benefit of their shareholders. Overall, this paper provides new empirical evidence on the debate 
about risk taking and investment policy association in the M&As setting. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
 Panel A: Compensation Variables 
Total Compensation (ExecuComp data item TDC1). It includes salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted 
(using Black-Scholes), and long term incentive payouts in the fiscal year t-1. 
  
Cash Compensation (ExecuComp data item TCC). It includes salary and bonus in the fiscal year t-1. 
  
Equity Compensation The difference between TDC1 and TCC. 
  
Option Compensation (ExecuComp data item OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE). The aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive during 
the year as valued using Standard & Poor's Black-Scholes methodology. 
  
CEO Wealth ($ 1,000) The sum of Stock Portfolio and Option Portfolio.  
  
Stock Portfolio ($ 1,000) The value of firm’s shares at the end of the fiscal year. It is the product of ExecuComp data item SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS (Shares  
Owned - Options Excluded) and COMPUSTAT data item PRCC_F (the stock price) at the end of the fiscal year.  
  
Option Portfolio ($ 1,000) The value of the options held by the CEO at the end of the fiscal year. It is defined as the sum of the estimated value of in-the-
money Unexercised Unexercisable Options (OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_EST_VAL) plus the estimated value of in-the-money 
Unexercised Exercisable Options (OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL). 
 
Vega 
 
Vega is the change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage change in the annualized standard deviation of stock 
returns at the end of the fiscal year. 
  
Delta The change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price at the end of the fiscal year. 
  
Vega Increase Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the difference between vega in year t and vega in year t-1, scaled by vega in year t-1,  is  
larger than 10%. 
  
Delta Increase Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the difference between delta in year t and delta in year t-1, scaled by delta in year t-1, is  
larger than 10%. 
 Panel B: Acquisition Variables 
Acquisitions Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm announced at least one acquisition in year t, 0 otherwise. The variable is created 
using data from Thomson Financial SDC.  
  
Acquisition Investments It is the sum of the announced acquisition deal values in year t scaled by firm’s sales in year t-1. Deal values are from Thomson 
Financial SDC, firm’s sales are from COMPUSTAT.    
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Increased Bidder Ret. Vol. Acq. Investments  It is the sum of the deal values of acquisitions of bidding firms announced in year t scaled by firm’s sales in year t-1, whose return 
volatility increased over the period 1 day to 60 days following the acquisition effective date relative to 120 days to 60 days prior to 
the acquisition announcement date. Deal values are from Thomson Financial SDC, firm’s sales are from COMPUSTAT. 
  
Large Acquisition Investments It is the sum of deal values of bidding firms that announced acquisitions in year t, whose value is more than 5% of the firm’s sales  
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. Deal values are from Thomson Financial SDC, firm’s sales are from COMPUSTAT.   
  
Private Acquisition Investments It is the sum of the announced private acquisition deal values in year t scaled by firm’s sales in year t-1. Deal values are from 
Thomson Financial SDC, firm’s sales are from COMPUSTAT.   
 
Diversifying Acquisition Investments 
 
It is the sum of the announced diversifying acquisition deal values in year t scaled by firm’s sales in year t-1. Deal values are from 
Thomson Financial SDC, firm’s sales are from COMPUSTAT. Diversifying Acquisition is based on the 4-digit SIC Code of target 
and bidding firms. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC.  
  
Bidder CARs (-2, +2) Cumulative abnormal return for the bidding firm in the 5-day event window (-2, +2) where 0 is the announcement day. The returns 
are calculated using the market model with the market model parameters estimated over the period starting 240 days and ending 41 
days prior to the announcement. CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return. 
  
Bidder CARs (-30, -3) Cumulative abnormal return for the bidding firm in pre-announcement period (-30, -3) where 0 is the announcement day. The 
returns are calculated using the market model with the market model parameters estimated over the period starting 240 days and 
ending 41 days prior to the announcement. CRSP value-weighted index return is the market return. 
  
Ln (MV) The natural logarithm of bidder market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP in US$ million. 
Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. 
  
Stock Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the method of payment is 100% stock, 0 otherwise. The variable is created 
using data from Thomson Financial SDC.  
  
Cash Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals where the method of payment is 100% cash, 0 otherwise. The variable is created 
using data from Thomson Financial SDC.  
 
Public 
 
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is a public firm, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from 
Thomson Financial SDC. 
 
Private 
 
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm is a private firm, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from 
Thomson Financial SDC. 
 
Relative Size 
 
It is the ratio between the deal value and the market capitalization of the acquiring firm 30 days prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Deal value is from Thomson Financial SDC, market capitalization is from CRSP. 
  
Diversifying Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the target firm operates in a different 4-digit SIC industry to the one of the bidder, 0 
otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson Financial SDC. 
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Completed Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is completed, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from Thomson 
Financial SDC. 
 
Hostile 
 
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for deals defined as "hostile" or "unsolicited" by Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.  
  
Return Volatility It is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. 
  
Excess Return Volatility It is the standard deviation of daily stock excess returns, where excess return is the difference of the firm stock return and the CRSP 
value-weighted index return. 
  
M&A Liquidity Sum of acquisitions value for each year and Fama-French 49 industry classification divided by the total assets of all COMPUSTAT 
firms in the same Fama-French 49 industry classification and year. 
  
Annualized Return Volatility It is the annualized standard deviation of bidder stock returns over the year prior to the acquisition. 
 Panel C: Control Variables 
Size Log of Sales. Sales represent firm’s total sales in the fiscal year from COMPUSTAT. 
 
B/M 
 
It is firm book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Cash Reserves It is defined as firm cash and short-term investments divided by the book value of total assets at the fiscal year-end from 
COMPUSTAT.  
  
Leverage It is defined as firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by the book value of total assets at 
the fiscal year-end from COMPUSTAT. 
  
Cash Flows It is defined as  (operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses minus taxes minus preferred dividends minus  
common dividends) scaled by the book value of total assets in the fiscal year from COMPUSTAT.  
  
CAPEX It is firm’s capital expenditures in the fiscal year, scaled by total assets from COMPUSTAT. 
  
Annualized Excess Return Volatility It is the annualized standard deviation of firm stock excess returns in the calendar year, where excess return is the difference 
between the firm stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index return. 
  
EBITDA/Interest Expenses It is the interest coverage ratio, calculated as EBITDA divided by interest expenses in the fiscal year from COMPUSTAT.  
  
Abnormal Return Buy-and-hold excess stock return over the calendar year defined as Π(1 + Ri,m)− Π(1 + Rp,m), where Ri,m and Rp,m are the return for 
firm i and the return of the benchmark portfolio for month m, respectively. Benchmark portfolios are the twenty-five Fama-French 
value-weighted portfolios based on size and book-to-market. 
 
Overconfidence 
 
Overconfidence is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the CEO is identified as overconfident, 0 otherwise. A CEO is 
overconfident if she postpones the exercise of vested options that are at least 67% in the money. Overconfidence is measured for 
every sample year. Firstly, for each CEO-year, the total realizable value of the options is divided by the number of options held by 
the CEO to determine the average realizable value per option. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal year-end stock price minus 
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the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is then calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated 
strike price minus one. Only the vested options held by the CEO are included in the computation. The variable is created using data 
from ExecuComp. 
  
Female Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female, 0 otherwise. The variable is created from the field “Gender” in 
ExecuComp.  
  
CEO Age It is the age of the CEO from ExecuComp. 
  
CEO Tenure It is the difference between year t and the year in which the CEO is appointed from ExecuComp. 
 
Entrenchment Index 
 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index from RiskMetrics. The index is the sum of binary variables concerning the following 
provisions: 1) Classified boards; 2) Limitations to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws; 3) Supermajority voting for business 
combinations; 4) Supermajority requirements for charter amendments; 5) Poison pills; and 6) Golden parachutes.  
  
Independent Directors Percentage of independent directors. It is the ratio between the number of independent directors, and the board size from 
RiskMetrics.  
  
DCS Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a dual-class shares firm, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from 
RiskMetrics. 
 
CEO/Chairman Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board are not split, 0 otherwise. The variable is 
created using data from RiskMetrics. 
  
Board Size Number of directors composing the board of directors from RiskMetrics.  
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Appendix B 
Variables Correlation Matrix 
This Appendix presents pairwise Pearson correlations of the variables used in the analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Cash Compensation 
1. Cash Compensation 
1.00                
2. Delta 0.25 1.00               
3. Vega 0.46 0.32 1.00              
4. B/M -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 1.00             
5. Cash Reserves  -0.13 0.06 -0.05 -0.17 1.00            
6. Leverage 0.11 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.37 1.00           
7. Cash Flows 0.07 0.08 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.19 1.00          
8. Size 0.46 0.23 0.48 -0.02 -0.13 0.08 0.03 1.00         
9. Female -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00        
10. CEO Tenure 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.13 0.03 0.01 0.07 -0.06 1.00       
11. CEO Age 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.40 1.00      
12. Overconfidence 0.03 0.17 -0.15 -0.20 0.09 -0.09 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.06 1.00     
13. Entrenchment Index -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 0.08 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 1.00    
14. DCS 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.16 1.00   
15. Independent Directors  -0.01 -0.14 0.10 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.03 -0.14 -0.13 0.27 -0.19 1.00  
16. CEO/Chairman 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.00 -0.13 0.07 0.05 0.16 -0.04 0.27 0.26 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.08 1.00 
17. Board Size 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.03 -0.31 0.16 -0.10 0.38 -0.04 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.11 
18. Ann. Excess Ret. Volatility -0.22 -0.08 -0.20 0.04 0.28 -0.03 -0.23 -0.19 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.12 
19. CAPEX -0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.29 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.01 
20. EBITDA/Int. Expenses -0.07 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 0.26 -0.30 0.21 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
21. Abnormal Return 0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.25 0.12 -0.09 0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.25 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 
22. M&A Liquidity -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 
 
 
 17. 18. 19.              20. 21. 22.     
17. Board Size 1.00          
18. Ann. Excess Return Volatility -0.30 1.00         
19. CAPEX -0.07 0.06 1.00        
20. EBITDA/Interest Expenses -0.16 0.01 0.04 1.00       
21. Abnormal Return -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.07 1.00      
22. M&A Liquidity -0.13 0.15 0.10 0.03 0.05 1.00     
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics on CEO Compensation, Acquisitions and Firm and Other CEO Characteristics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics on CEO compensation, acquisitions and firm and other CEO 
characteristics for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp over the period 1996-2010. 
Panel A reports the mean, median and standard deviation for CEO compensation and wealth. Panel B reports the 
statistics for firm and CEO characteristics used in the empirical analysis. Panel C reports statistics for the 
acquisition variables. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. N denotes  the number of observations. 
Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator.  
 
Panel A: Compensation Variables Mean Median Std. Dev N 
Total Compensation ($ 1,000) 4,693.16 2,599.72 6,134.97 28,332 
Cash Compensation ($ 1,000) 1,265.87 887.49 1,223.48 28,332 
Equity Compensation ($ 1,000) 3,427.29 1,472.09 5,353.78 28,332 
Option Compensation ($ 1,000) 2,311.24 696.52 4,511.85 19,063 
CEO Wealth ($ 1,000) 66,279.80 12,655.06 195,768.10 26,772 
Stock Portfolio ($ 1,000) 53,294.75 6,387.14 181,079.60 26,820 
Option Portfolio ($ 1,000) 11,120.13 2,276.96 24,882.47 27,974 
Vega ($ 1,000) 130.27 46.65 227.16 28,332 
Delta ($ 1,000) 842.01 234.40 2,096.95 26,834 
Panel B: Firm and CEO Characteristics     
Size ($ 1,000,000) 4,387.03 1,178.63 9,140.71 28,256 
B/M 0.5392 0.4604 0.5296 24,358 
Cash Reserves 0.1456 0.0710 0.1742 28,262 
Leverage 0.2288 0.2068 0.1949 28,157 
Cash Flows 0.0704 0.0742 0.0907 28,270 
Overconfidence 0.4669 0.0000 0.4989 28,310 
Female 0.0201 0.0000 0.1404 28,332 
CEO Tenure 6.6935 5.0000 6.8983 26,943 
CEO Age 55.4218 55.0000 7.2977 26,488 
Entrenchment Index 2.4507 2.0000 1.3870 22,061 
DCS 0.0878 0.0000 0.2830 22,061 
Independent Directors  0.6870 0.7143 0.16926 19,645 
CEO/Chairman 0.6139 1.0000 0.4869 19,645 
Board Size 9.5131 9.0000 2.6902 19,645 
Annualized Return Volatility 0.4243 0.3649 0.2337 27,397 
EBITDA/Interest Expenses 57.0343 8.4325 209.2367 22,956 
CAPEX 0.0518 0.0364 0.0532 27,171 
Abnormal Return 0.0401 0.0171 0.0729 28,293 
Panel C: Acquisition Variables 
Acquisition Investment in US$ million 117.9303 0.0000 486.352 28,332 
Acquisition Investment (Sum of Deal Values/Sales) 0.074262 0.0000 0.276447 28,208 
Acquisitions Dummy 0.228399 0.0000 0.419808 28,332 
M&A Liquidity -0.0404 -0.0666 0.5912 28,332 
Relative Size 0.1149 0.0338 0.2246 9,446 
Diversifying 0.3418 0.0000 0.4743 9,615 
Completed 0.9198 1.0000 0.2716 9,615 
Hostile 0.0130 0.0000 0.1133 9,615 
Public 0.2155 0.0000 0.4112 9,615 
Private 0.7845 1.0000 0.4112 9,615 
Stock 18.7556 0.0000 36.3149 9,615 
Cash 45.87794 30.628 46.74625 9,615 
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Table 2 
Change in Bidder Risk 
The table presents bidder means and medians for the standard deviation of daily stock returns and daily excess returns 
computed during four event periods: 1) the pre-announcement period, which covers 120 days to 60 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement date; 2) the announcement period, which is from 30 days prior to 30 days following the 
acquisition announcement; 3) the post-announcement period, which covers 60 days to 120 days following the acquisition 
announcement date; and 4) the post effective date period, which is from 1 to 60 days after the day the acquisition becomes 
effective. Mean and median differences between post-announcement and pre-announcement periods, between announcement 
and pre-announcement periods, and between post-effective date and pre-announcement periods standard deviations are also 
reported. Excess return is defined as the difference between bidder stock return and the CRSP value-weighted index return. 
The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data 
on ExecuComp. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively for 
the t-test of differences between means (Mean) and the Wilcoxon rank sum test for differences between the respective 
distributions (Median). N denotes the number of observations. 
 
         
      Pre Announcement (1)      Announcement Period (2)    Post Announcement (3)    Post Effective Date (4) 
         
 
    Return 
  Volatility 
Excess 
Return 
Volatility 
    Return 
   Volatility 
Excess Return 
Volatility 
Return 
  Volatility 
Excess 
Return 
Volatility 
Return 
Volatility 
Excess 
Return 
Volatility 
Mean 2.620% 2.3545% 2.7044% 2.4100% 2.7047% 2.4107% 2.7316% 2.4222% 
Median 2.2717% 2.0216% 2.3022% 2.0405% 2.2973% 2.0376% 2.2868% 2.0225% 
N 9,592 9,592 9,592 9,592 9,592 9,592 8,771 8,771 
 
 
                  Difference (3) – (1)                Difference (2) – (1)               Difference (4) – (1) 
       
 
    Return 
  Volatility 
Excess Return 
Volatility 
     Return 
   Volatility 
Excess Return 
Volatility 
Return 
  Volatility 
Excess Return 
Volatility 
Mean 0.0757%*** 0.0562%*** 0.0754%*** 0.0555%*** 0.1116%*** 0.0677%*** 
Median 0.0057%*** 0.0142%*** 0.0085%*** 0.0140%*** 0.0151%*** 0.0009%** 
N 9,592 9,592 9,592 9,592 8,771 8,771 
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Table 3 
Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments 
The table presents in specification (1) the estimates of a pooled tobit regression with clustered standard errors at 
firm level where the dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of acquisition investments made in a given 
year scaled by sales in the previous year. Specification (2) presents the estimates of a pooled probit regression 
with clustered standard errors at firm level where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a firm made an 
acquisition in a given year, and zero otherwise. The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and December 
31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for definitions 
of the variables. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Dollar values are stated in 2005 
dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in brackets. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Acquisition Investments (Tobit)  Acquisitions (Probit) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Constant -0.6670***  -1.5120*** 
 [0.2337]  [0.3525]    
Vega 0.1139***  0.1647**  
 [0.0413]  [0.0747]    
Delta 0.0135***  0.0127 
 [0.0051]  [0.0079]    
Size 0.0043  0.0769*** 
 [0.0087]  [0.0152]    
B/M -0.0478***  -0.0729*** 
 [0.0163]  [0.0258]    
Cash Reserves 0.0709  -0.0614 
 [0.0648]  [0.1025]    
Leverage -0.0302  -0.1345 
 [0.0508]  [0.0836]    
Cash Flows 0.3752***  0.9663*** 
 [0.1094]  [0.1584]    
Overconfidence 0.0636***  0.1049*** 
 [0.0150]  [0.0251]    
Cash Compensation 0.0492***  0.0671**  
 [0.0160]  [0.0267]    
Female -0.0040  -0.0613 
 [0.0675]  [0.0964]    
CEO Tenure -0.0016  0.0004 
 [0.0014]  [0.0022]    
CEO Age -0.0051***  -0.0070*** 
 [0.0014]  [0.0022]    
Abnormal Return 0.0700***  0.0615*** 
 [0.0138]  [0.0192]    
M&A Liquidity 0.0639  -0.0196 
 [0.1085]  [0.1677]    
    
Year & Industry FE yes  yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0630  0.0667 
Observations 21,289  21,289 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
Table 4 
Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments by CEO Confidence Level  
The table presents the estimates of pooled tobit regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level where 
the dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of acquisition investments made in a given year scaled 
by sales in the previous year. In specification (1) the overall sample is used in the analysis. In specifications 
(2) and (3) we partition the sample by overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. The definition for 
overconfidence, as well as for all other variables, is in appendix A. The sample period is between January 1, 
1997 and December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. All 
independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All variables are winsorized at the 
1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the 
World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are 
suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Acquisition Investments (Tobit) 
 All (1) O verconfident (2) Non-O verconfident (3) 
Constant -0.6849*** -0.4925* -0.8247***  
 [0.2329] [0.2542] [0.2782]  
Vega 0.1819*** -0.0035 0.1494***  
 [0.0446] [0.0667] [0.0450]  
Delta 0.0062 0.0196*** 0.0030  
 [0.0071] [0.0061] [0.0071]  
Vega*O verconfidence -0.1860***    
 [0.0635]    
Delta*O verconfidence 0.0111    
 [0.0082]    
Size 0.0028 -0.0019 0.0024  
 [0.0087] [0.0128] [0.0095]  
B/M -0.0464*** -0.0659** -0.0435**  
 [0.0163] [0.0309] [0.0176]  
Cash Reserves 0.0704 0.1014 0.0387  
 [0.0647] [0.0855] [0.0819]  
Leverage -0.0277 0.0998 -0.1448**  
 [0.0506] [0.0743] [0.0579]  
Cash Flows 0.3741*** 0.0547 0.6521***  
 [0.1094] [0.1655] [0.1318]  
O verconfidence 0.0797***    
 [0.0169]    
Cash Compensation 0.0523*** 0.0589*** 0.0553***  
 [0.0158] [0.0223] [0.0184]  
Female -0.0046 -0.0306 -0.0125  
 [0.0679] [0.1200] [0.0781]  
CEO  Tenure -0.0017 -0.0031* -0.0002  
 [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0015]  
CEO  Age -0.0051*** -0.0057*** -0.0041***  
 [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0016]  
Abnormal Return 0.0693*** 0.0864*** 0.0341*   
 [0.0138] [0.0192] [0.0184]  
M&A Liquidity 0.0610 0.0167 0.0743  
 [0.1085] [0.1585] [0.1394]  
     
Year & Industry FE yes yes yes  
Pseudo R
2
 0.0635 0.0607 0.0673  
O bservations 21,289 9,318 11,971  
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Table 5 
Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments: The Role of Corporate Governance 
The table presents the estimates of pooled tobit regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level where the dependent variable is the 
sum of the deal values of all acquisition investments made in a given year scaled by sales in the previous year. T he sample period is 
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A 
for definitions of the variabl es. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent vari able. All variables are winsorized at  
the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer 
price index defl ator. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coeffi cients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 
industry classification dummies, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are report ed in brackets. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Acquisition Investments (Tobit) 
  (1) (2) (3)  
Constant  -0.6628*** -0.5130** -0.5197**  
  [0.2454] [0.2575] [0.2548]  
Vega  0.1031* 0.2718* 0.4941**  
  [0.0619] [0.1586] [0.2009]  
Delta   0.0113 0.0125 0.0235  
  [0.0078] [0.0156] [0.0241]  
Vega*Entrenchment Index  -0.0085 -0.0158 -0.0189  
  [0.0221] [0.0225] [0.0222]  
Delta*Entrenchment Index  -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0012  
  [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0032]  
Vega*Indep. Directors    -0.2263 -0.2311  
   [0.2107] [0.2063]  
Delta*Indep. Directors    -0.0032 -0.0096  
   [0.0247] [0.0245]  
Vega*DCS     -0.2068*  
    [0.1253]  
Delta*DCS     -0.0134  
    [0.0107]  
Vega*Board Size    -0.0099  
    [0.0124]  
Delta*Board Size    0.0001  
    [0.0018]  
Vega*CEO/Chairman    -0.1213*  
    [0.0692]  
Delta*CEO/Chairman    -0.0075  
    [0.0093]  
Size  0.0135 0.0066 0.0042  
  [0.0082] [0.0084] [0.0090]  
B/M  -0.0537*** -0.0861*** -0.0844***  
  [0.0168] [0.0209] [0.0209]  
Cash Reserves   0.0653 0.0584 0.0526  
  [0.0662] [0.0678] [0.0680]  
Leverage  -0.0481 -0.0124 -0.0170  
  [0.0498] [0.0533] [0.0532]  
Cash Flows  0.3507*** 0.1917 0.1843  
  [0.1132] [0.1285] [0.1294]  
Overconfidence  0.0589*** 0.0564*** 0.0565***  
  [0.0146] [0.0150] [0.0150]  
Cash Compensation  0.0563*** 0.0588*** 0.0559***  
  [0.0152] [0.0157] [0.0155]  
Female  -0.0291 -0.0563 -0.0621  
  [0.0638] [0.0706] [0.0689]  
CEO Tenure  -0.0015 -0.0026** -0.0031**  
  [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]  
CEO Age  -0.0050*** -0.0045*** -0.0046***  
  [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]  
Abnormal Return  0.0373*** 0.0475*** 0.0490***  
  [0.0135] [0.0147] [0.0147]  
M&A Liquidity  -0.0178 -0.0240 -0.0285  
  [0.1154] [0.1167] [0.1172]  
Entrenchment Index  0.0130* 0.0079 0.0078  
  [0.0071] [0.0076] [0.0077]  
Independent Directors    0.0035 0.0072  
   [0.0627] [0.0630]  
DCS    0.0482  
    [0.0394]  
CEO/Chairman    0.0025  
    [0.0047]  
Board Size    0.0380*  
    [0.0196]  
Year & Industry FE  yes yes yes  
Pseudo R2  0.0663 0.0672 0.0683  
Observations  17,594 15,345 15,345  
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Table 6 
Predicted and Residual Vega and Delta 
The table presents the estimates of pooled tobit regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level where the 
dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of all acquisition investments made in a given year scaled by 
sales in the previous year. The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 for the 
universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. Predicted and residual lagged vega and delta are 
the predicted values and residuals from regressions of vega and delta on endogenous and control variables 
shown in Table 3. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All independent variables are lagged with 
respect to the dependent variable. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both  tails, with the exception of 
binary variables. Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. 
Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 
49 industry classification dummies, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm 
level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
  Acquisition Investments (Tobit)  
  (1) (2)  
Constant  0.1401 5.6382***  
  [0.2894] [0.6505]  
Predicted Vega  0.7576*** 6.4658***  
  [0.2295] [0.8054]  
Residual Vega   -0.7481***  
   [0.1550]  
Predicted Delta  0.0670*** 0.2591***  
  [0.0211] [0.0783]  
Residual Delta   -0.1488***  
   [0.0179]  
Size  -0.0586*** -0.4961***  
  [0.0174] [0.0482]  
B/M  -0.0130 0.1908***  
  [0.0191] [0.0349]  
Cash Reserves  0.2414*** 0.3082***  
  [0.0730] [0.0706]  
Leverage  0.0331 0.5542***  
  [0.0574] [0.0940]  
Cash Flows  0.6769*** 1.3462***  
  [0.1218] [0.1456]  
Overconfidence  0.0557*** 0.0465***  
  [0.0152] [0.0147]  
Cash Compensation  0.0018 -0.3942***  
  [0.0224] [0.0507]  
Female  -0.0130 -0.0105  
  [0.0703] [0.0681]  
CEO Tenure  -0.0056*** -0.0276***  
  [0.0021] [0.0052]  
CEO Age  -0.0049*** -0.0048***  
  [0.0014] [0.0013]  
Abnormal Return  0.0552*** 0.0630***  
  [0.0140] [0.0144]  
M&A Liquidity  -0.0703 -0.0987  
  [0.1175] [0.1194]  
     
Year & Industry FE  yes yes  
Pseudo R
2
  0.0696 0.0784  
Observations  17,797 17,797  
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Table 7 
Systems of Simultaneous Equations 
The table presents the estimates of systems of simultaneous equations running 3SLS regressions where the 
dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of all acquisition investments made in a given year scaled by sales 
in the previous year and the jointly determined variables are the acquisition investments, vega and delta. The 
sample period is between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms 
with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables . All independent variables are 
contemporaneous. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. 
Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and industry 
fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry 
classification dummies, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are reported 
in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Acquisition Investments  Vega  Delta  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
       
Constant 0.7296***  -0.7475***  -3.7600***  
 [0.0294]     [0.0169]     [0.1450]     
Acquisition Investments   0.4159***  6.9570***  
   [0.0289]     [0.2952]     
Vega 0.6991***    -1.1081***  
 [0.0319]       [0.1995]     
Delta 0.0580***  0.0072***    
 [0.0042]     [0.0021]       
Size -0.0776***  0.0603***  0.5629***  
 [0.0026]     [0.0016]     [0.0202]     
B/M 0.0430***  -0.0279***  -0.4124***  
 [0.0042]     [0.0030]     [0.0324]     
Cash Reserves -0.0019      
 [0.0129]         
Leverage 0.1397***  -0.0678***  -1.2855***  
 [0.0115]     [0.0089]     [0.0889]     
Cash Flows 0.0389*    -0.1056***    
 [0.0219]     [0.0199]       
O verconfidence 0.0195***      
 [0.0049]         
Cash Compensation -0.0348***  0.0654***    
 [0.0036]     [0.0026]       
Female 0.0042      
 [0.0108]         
CEO  Tenure -0.0048***    0.0765***  
 [0.0004]       [0.0023]     
CEO  Age -0.0005**       
 [0.0002]         
Abnormal Return 0.0027      
 [0.0028]         
M&A Liquidity 0.0867***      
 [0.0213]         
CAPEX   -0.0592**   0.3806  
   [0.0261]     [0.2587]     
Annualized Excess Ret. Volatility   -0.0085  0.1859***  
   [0.0065]     [0.0654]     
EBITDA/Interest Expenses   0.0103    
   [0.0067]       
       
Year & Industry FE yes  yes  yes  
O bservations 17,797  17,797  17,797  
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Table 8 
Impact of Unobserved Confounding Variables 
The table present the analysis for the impact of unobserved confounding variables. For the main control variable 
(vega) an impact statistic is calculated (ITCV) indicating the minimum impact of a confounding variable that 
would be needed to render the coefficient statistically insignificant. The ITCV is defined as the product of the 
correlation between the x-variable (i.e., vega) and the confounding variable and the correlation between the y-
variable (i.e., acquisition investments) and the confounding variable. To assess the likelihood that such a 
variable exists, column (2) shows the impact of each independent variable on the coefficient of vega. The impact 
is defined as the product of the partial correlation between the x-variable (i.e., vega) and the control variable and 
the correlation between the y-variable (acquisition investments) and the control variable (partialling out the 
effect of the other control variables). Column (3) shows a more conservative measure of impact, which is the 
product of the simple correlation between the x-variable and the control variable and the simple correlation 
between the y-variable and the control variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ITCV Impact Impact Raw  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Vega 0.0145   
    
Delta  0.0160 0.0171 
    
Size  -0.0226 -0.0470 
    
B/M  0.0014 0.0062 
    
Cash Reserves  0.0058 -0.0049 
    
Leverage  -0.0004 -0.0008 
    
Cash Flows  0.0001 -0.0012 
    
Overconfidence  -0.0046 -0.0081 
    
Cash compensation  0.0101 -0.0060 
    
Female  0.0000 -0.0001 
    
CEO Tenure  0.0000 -0.0002 
    
CEO Age  0.0008 -0.0035 
    
Abnormal Return  -0.0010 -0.0018 
    
M&A Liquidity  0.0008 -0.0008 
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Table 9 
Increase in Risk-Taking Incentives and Acquisition Investments 
The table presents in specification (1) the estimates of a pooled tobit regression with clustered standard errors at 
firm level where the dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of all acquisition investments made in a 
given year scaled by sales in the previous year. Specification (2) presents the estimates of a pooled probit 
regression with clustered standard errors at firm level where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a 
firm made an acquisition in a given year, and zero otherwise. The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and 
December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for 
definitions of the variables. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Dollar values are stated 
in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and industry fixed effects, whose 
coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in brackets. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Acquisition Investments (Tobit)  Acquisitions (Probit) 
 (1)  (2) 
    
Constant -0.8273***  -1.7254*** 
 [0.2325]  [0.3572]    
Vega Increase 0.0496***  0.0719*** 
 [0.0127]  [0.0216]    
Delta Increase 0.0286*   0.0415*   
 [0.0151]  [0.0244]    
Size 0.0211***  0.1004*** 
 [0.0081]  [0.0148]    
B/M -0.0407**  -0.0616**  
 [0.0162]  [0.0274]    
Cash Reserves 0.0665  -0.0856 
 [0.0676]  [0.1094]    
Leverage -0.0541  -0.1737*   
 [0.0524]  [0.0902]    
Cash Flows 0.5368***  1.1285*** 
 [0.1161]  [0.1738]    
Overconfidence 0.0609***  0.1041*** 
 [0.0154]  [0.0267]    
Cash Compensation 0.0504***  0.0635**  
 [0.0166]  [0.0279]    
Female -0.0264  -0.0917 
 [0.0658]  [0.1048]    
CEO Tenure 0.0001  0.0022 
 [0.0013]  [0.0023]    
CEO Age -0.0043***  -0.0059**  
 [0.0014]  [0.0024]    
Abnormal Return 0.0481***  0.0455**  
 [0.0154]  [0.0223]    
M&A Liquidity -0.0462  -0.1380 
 [0.1146]  [0.1788]    
    
Year & Industry FE yes  yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0646  0.0693 
Observations 18,265  18,265 
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Table 10 
Risk-Taking Incentives and Risky Acquisition Investments 
The table presents the estimates of pooled tobit regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level where the 
dependent variable is the sum of the deal values of: i) acquisition investments with increased bidder return 
volatility; ii) large acquisition investments; iii) private acquisition investments; and iv) diversifying acquisition 
investments. The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 for the universe of US 
publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All independent 
variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails. 
Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and 
industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 
industry classification dummies, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level 
are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
  Acquisitions Investments (Tobit) 
 
Increased Bidder 
Return Volatility  
Large Private Diversifying 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant -0.7106*** -0.8423*** -0.3616*** -0.7058*** 
 [0.1294] [0.3180] [0.1066] [0.1664] 
Vega 0.0842*** 0.1311*  0.0693*** 0.1038*** 
 [0.0325] [0.0679] [0.0242] [0.0320] 
Delta 0.0084** 0.0227*** 0.0088*** 0.0093** 
 [0.0033] [0.0072] [0.0030] [0.0039] 
Size 0.0109 -0.0820*** -0.0126** 0.0099 
 [0.0071] [0.0131] [0.0052] [0.0072] 
B/M -0.0078 -0.0586** -0.0209** -0.0431*** 
 [0.0139] [0.0249] [0.0100] [0.0132] 
Cash Reserves -0.0246 0.0897 0.0058 -0.0434 
 [0.0507] [0.0925] [0.0393] [0.0531] 
Leverage -0.0247 0.0431 -0.0019 -0.0557 
 [0.0413] [0.0761] [0.0309] [0.0417] 
Cash Flows 0.3344*** 0.7325*** 0.2171*** 0.2085** 
 [0.0858] [0.1574] [0.0628] [0.0861] 
Overconfidence 0.0242*  0.0930*** 0.0412*** 0.0488*** 
 [0.0128] [0.0233] [0.0092] [0.0124] 
Cash Compensation 0.0143 0.0924*** 0.0188*  0.0270** 
 [0.0130] [0.0239] [0.0096] [0.0132] 
Female 0.0029 0.0195 0.0021 0.0011 
 [0.0467] [0.0972] [0.0390] [0.0577] 
CEO Tenure -0.0007 -0.0044** -0.0005 -0.0022** 
 [0.0011] [0.0021] [0.0008] [0.0011] 
CEO Age -0.0020* -0.0068*** -0.0024*** -0.0012 
 [0.0011] [0.0021] [0.0008] [0.0011] 
Abnormal Return 0.0695*** 0.0899*** 0.0415*** 0.0462*** 
 [0.0108] [0.0204] [0.0083] [0.0112] 
M&A Liquidity 0.1800*  0.1505 0.1171*  0.0043 
 [0.0934] [0.1603] [0.0646] [0.0996] 
     
Year & Industry FE yes yes yes yes 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0892 0.0667 0.0736 0.0763 
Observations 21,289 21,289 21,289 21,289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 11 
Within Firm Results 
The table presents the estimates of a logit regression with firm fixed effects and clustered standard errors at firm 
level where the dependent variable takes the value of one if a firm made an acquisition in a given year, and zero 
otherwise. This analysis includes firm and year fixed effects. The sample period is between January 1, 1997 and 
December 31, 2011 for the universe of US publicly listed firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for 
definitions of the variables. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails, with the exception of binary variables. Dollar values are stated 
in 2005 dollars using the World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Heteroskedasticity -robust clustered 
standard errors at firm level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Acquisitions (Logit) 
   
Vega   0.2699*   
  [0.1436]    
Delta  0.0072 
  [0.0165]    
Size  -0.1422**  
  [0.0608]    
B/M  -0.3535*** 
  [0.0697]    
Cash Reserves  1.8309*** 
  [0.2522]    
Leverage  -1.7321*** 
  [0.2190]    
Cash Flows  2.9649*** 
  [0.4109]    
Overconfidence  0.1039**  
  [0.0508]    
Cash Compensation  0.0932*   
  [0.0508]    
Female  -0.2829 
  [0.2486]    
CEO Tenure  -0.0074 
  [0.0059]    
CEO Age  -0.0057 
  [0.0052]    
Abnormal Return  0.0046 
  [0.0401]    
M&A Liquidity  -0.1472 
  [0.3736]    
   
Firm and Year FE  yes 
Pseudo R
2
  0.0393 
Observations  15,100 
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Table 12 
Risk-Taking Incentives and Bidder 5-day CARs 
The table presents the estimates of OLS regressions with clustered standard errors at firm level of bidder 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement over 
the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2011 on vega and other control characteristics for the 
universe of US publicly listed bidding firms with data on ExecuComp. See Appendix A for definitions of the 
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% on both tails. Dollar values are stated in 2005 dollars using the 
World Bank’s consumer price index deflator. Year and industry fixed effects, whose coefficients are suppressed, 
are based on calendar year and Fama-French 49 industry classification dummies, respectively. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors at firm level are reported in brackets. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Bidder 5-day CARs 
s 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.0426** 0.0521*** 0.0522*** 
 [0.0194] [0.0197] [0.0199]    
Vega 0.0072** 0.0083** 0.0085**  
 [0.0030] [0.0037] [0.0043]    
Delta  0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0006]    
Vega*Public  0.0004 0.0004 
  [0.0071] [0.0072]    
Delta*Public  0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
  [0.0006] [0.0006]    
Vega*Overconfidence   -0.0001 
   [0.0056]    
Delta*Overconfidence   0.0001 
   [0.0006]    
Ln (MV) -0.0031*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0008]    
B/M -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0021 
 [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0040]    
Cash Reserves  -0.0146** -0.0126 -0.0126 
 [0.0073] [0.0078] [0.0078]    
Leverage -0.0020 -0.0049 -0.0049 
 [0.0062] [0.0067] [0.0067]    
Relative Size -0.0093 -0.0109* -0.0109*   
 [0.0058] [0.0062] [0.0062]    
Diversifying 0.0019 0.0027 0.0027 
 [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0018]    
Completed  0.0053* 0.0049 0.0049 
 [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0033]    
Hostile -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0012 
 [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0072]    
Public -0.0157*** -0.0191*** -0.0191*** 
 [0.0023] [0.0032] [0.0032]    
Annualized Return Volatility -0.0591 -0.1118 -0.1120 
 [0.1192] [0.1249] [0.1249]    
Cash Flows 0.0106 0.0135 0.0135 
 [0.0155] [0.0161] [0.0161]    
CEO Age -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]    
Overconfidence 0.0013 0.0010 0.0009 
 [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0021]    
Stock -0.0081** -0.0092** -0.0092**  
 [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0041]    
Bidder CAR (-30, -3) -0.0077 -0.0081 -0.0081 
 [0.0083] [0.0088] [0.0088]    
M&A Liquidity -0.0349*** -0.0314** -0.0314**  
 [0.0121] [0.0124] [0.0124]    
    
Year and Industry FE yes yes yes  
Adjusted R2 0.0275 0.0301 0.0298 
Observations 6,982 6,285 6,285 
 
